October 10, 2008

Fraudulent Joinder & Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Federal District Courts

The following is a basic approach to opposing an allegation of Fraudulent Joinder by the defendant(s) after the Plaintiff(s) has moved (or via Order to Show Cause) the Fed. District Court to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction:

28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States. If this jurisdictional requirement is met, a party to a State action may move pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 to have the matter transferred to Federal District Court. "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). A corporation is considered a citizen “of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. §1332(c).
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of the parties. That is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990).
Removal statutes "are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985)), cert. dismissed sub nom. American Standard v. Steel Valley Auth., 484 U.S. 1021, 108 S.Ct. 739, 98 L.Ed.2d 756 (1988).
The Third Circuit summarized the standards to be applied in a fraudulent joinder analysis as follows:
A district court must consider a number of settled precepts in ruling on a petition to remand a case to state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction. When a nondiverse party has been joined as a defendant, then in the absence of a substantial federal question the removing defendant may avoid remand only by demonstrating that the non-diverse party was fraudulently joined. But the removing party carries a heavy burden of persuasion in making this showing. It is logical that it should have this burden, for removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.

Joinder is fraudulent where there is no reasonable basis in fact or colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant, or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the defendants or seek a joint judgment
. But, if there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court. . . .

In evaluating the alleged fraud, the district court must focus on the plaintiff's complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. In so ruling, the district court must assume as true all factual allegations of the complaint. It also must resolve any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff.


In Re Briscoe
, 448 F.3d at 217, (citing to Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851-52 (3d Cir. 1992) ).


Pleadings are grounded in colorable claims
In assessing whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a defendant, the Court must focus on the factual allegation in the Complaint. Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 217 (3d Cir. 2006). Unless the claims against the non-diverse defendant is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” joinder cannot be considered fraudulent. Id. at 218. When the district court reviews the Plaintiffs pleadings, it “must assume as true all factual allegations of the complaint. It also must resolve any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff.” Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 217 (quoting Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851-52 (punctuation and citations omitted).

In evaluating the alleged fraud, the district court must focus on the plaintiff's complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 217 (quoting Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851-52 (punctuation and citations omitted).
The District Court, "[i]n conducting its analysis…is not limited to the pleadings; rather, it may look beyond the pleadings `to identify indicia of fraudulent joinder.'" Pinnacle Choice, Inc. v. Silverstein, No. 07-5857, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36786, at *18,19 (D.N.J. May 6, 2008), quoting In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2006). However, "[i]n so doing, `a district court must not step `from the threshold jurisdictional issue into a decision on the merits.'" Pinnacle, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36786, at *19, quoting Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219. In Briscoe, the Court stated that “[a]ssuming a district can ‘pierce the pleadings’ to determine whether a plaintiff has asserted a colorable claim against the non-diverse defendant, ‘that inquiry is far different from the summary judgment type inquiry made by the district court here.’” Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 218. In other words, it is impermissible for the district court to reach the merits of the claims in deciding fraudulent joinder questions; these determinations are best left to the state courts. Thus, "[a] district court must resolve all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff and must interpret any uncertainties as to the current state of controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff." Winged Lion, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26347, at *7, citing Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corporation, 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
"If there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court." See Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 217 and Gil v. Related Mgmt. Co., No. 06-2174, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56757, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Aug. 14, 2006), citing Boyer v. Snap-on-Tools, Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).



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